ALLEN STEEL COMPANY v. DESERET TITLE HOLDING CORPORATION : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2002
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY v. DESERET TITLE
HOLDING CORPORATION : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
bruce A. Maak; Clark Waddoups; Larsen, Kimball, Parr and Crockett; Wilford A. Beesley; Jack
Fairclough; Beesley and Fairclough; Attorneys for Appellants.
Joseph J. Palmer; H. Dennis Piercey; Moyle and Draper; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, ALLEN STEEL COMPANY v. DESERET TITLE HOLDING CORPORATION, No. 20532.00 (Utah Supreme Court,
2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2014
tfXltf „, 
U ^ . . , c t r t #** 
IN THE SUPREME $$URT OF THE STATE OF UTAH o o c i ) ^ 
8^.9 OA^i?^ 
STEEL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, Respon-
dent , and 
Cross-Appellant 
vs. 
DESERET TITLE HOLDING CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, SALT LAKE 
CITY CORPORATION, a body corporate 
and politic, 
[Continued on next page] 
Case No. 20532 
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, PRESIDING 
Bruce A. Maak, of Counsel 
Clark Waddoups 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR & CROCKETT 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Crossroads Plaza Associates 
and Equitable and Cross-
Respondent Landowners 
Wilford A. Beesley 
Jack Fairclough 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Okland-Foulger Co. and others 
interested in Okland-Foulger 
10l789.mbJidp.perdKar.aac 
Joseph J. Palmer 
H. Dennis Piercey 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant 
Allen Steel Co. 
RLf 
0CT2613S* 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, a corporation 
organized under the laws of the 
United States of America, 
ORIGINAL UTAH WOOLEN MILLS, 
a Utah corporation, CHRISTIANSEN 
ENTERPRISES, a general partner-
ship, REVA L. CHRISTIANSEN, 
an individual general partner 
of Christiansen Enterprises, 
DARLENE C. JACKSON, an individual 
general partner of Christiansen 
Enterprises, ROYAL L. TRIBE, an 
individual, RICHARD A. ISAACSON, 
an individual, JULIA M. SMOOT, 
an individual, JACK L. MECHAM, 
an individual, THELMA M. HINTZE, 
an individual, VERNER H. ZINIK, 
an individual, DONNA R. ZINIK, 
an individual, VERNER H. ZINIK, 
as Trustee, 
Defendants and 
Cross-Respondents, 
and 
CROSS ROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah limited partnership, 
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE 
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, a New York corpora-
tion, OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY, a 
Maryland general partnership, 
SID FOULGER, INC., a Maryland 
corporation, JACK OKLAND INC., 
a Utah corporation, FOULGER 
PROPERTIES LIMITED, a Maryland 
limited partnership, OKLAND 
PROPERTIES LIMITED, a Utah 
limited partnership, MARY FLINT 
FOULGER, and individual general 
partner of FOULGER PROPERTIES 
LIMITED, JAMES L. DAVIS and 
ANNE F. DAVIS, both individual 
general partners of Foulger 
Properties Limited, 
Defendants, 
Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents. 
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JERALD M. TAYLOR, d/b/a TAYLOR ELECTRIC, INC. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE:1 <W UTAH 
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY, 
corporation., 
tah 
PlaintI ££, Respon-
dent , and 
Cross-Appe 
vs. 
DESERET TITLE HOLDING CORPORATION" 
a Utah corporation, SALT LAKE 
CITY CORPORATION, a body 
corporate and politic, 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
ASSOCIATION, a corporation 
organized under the laws of 
United States of America, 
ORIGINAL UTAH WOOLEN MILLS, 
a Utah corporation, CHRISTIANSEN 
ENTERPRISES, a general partner-
ship, REVA L. CHRISTIANSEN, 
an individual general partner 
of Christiansen Enterprises, 
DARLENE C. JACKSON, an Individ " 
general partner of Christiansen 
Enterprises, ROYAL L. TRIBE, an 
individual, RICHARD A. ISAACSON, 
an individual, JULIA M. SMOOT, 
an individual, JACK L. MECHAM, 
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i' Individual, 
an individual, 
an individual, 
• in Individual, 
as Trustee, 
De fendants and 
Cross-Respondents, 
Case Nu. zuoj-d 
and 
CROSS ROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah limited partnership, 
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE 
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, a New York corpora 
tion, OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY, a 
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Maryland general partnership, 
SID FOULGER, INC., a Maryland 
corporation, JACK OKLAND INC., 
a Utah corporation, FOULGER 
PROPERTIES LIMITED, a Maryland 
limited partnership, OKLAND 
PROPERTIES LIMITED, a Utah 
limited partnership, MARY FLINT 
FOULGER, and individual general 
partner of FOULGER PROPERTIES 
LIMITED, JAMES L. DAVIS and 
ANNE F. DAVIS, both individual 
general partners of Foulger 
Properties Limited, 
Defendants, 
Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Allen Steel Company, Cross-Appellant, respectfully 
petitions for rehearing on the point regarding liability of the 
"landowners."1 Counsel certifies that this petition is presented 
in good faith and not for delay. 
The issue of the "Landowners' Liability" is addressed 
in part VII of the Court's opinion.2 There the opinion states 
The landowners are listed on page i, supra. 
2
 At the outset, the opinion notes: "Allen Steel cross-
appeals the trial court's refusal to enforce its mechanic's lien 
against the landowners . . . . Allen Steel does not appeal the 
trial court's award of attorney fees to the landowners and 
against Allen Steel." Opinion at 2. This overlooks: (1) this 
appeal went to the correctness of the trial court's denial of the 
lien, the issue of attorney's fees not having been finally 
determined by the trial court, Opinion at 7-9, and (2) if the 
(continued...) 
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that "Allen Steel challenges the conclusion that there is no 
evidence that the landowners would benefit from the construction 
of the Crossroads project at the end of the leases." Opinion at 
21-22. Noting no direct evidence was presented of the value of 
the improvements beyond the stated lease period of 62 years plus 
three 10-year option periods, the opinion concluded that "[i]t 
follows . . . that there is no lien against the landowners1 fee 
estate." Opinion at 23. In discussing the issue, the Court also 
stated "there [is no] indication or evidence that Crossroads or 
Equitable were agents of the landowners." Opinion at 22. 
Our primary point on appeal was not that there was 
direct evidence of increased value at the end of the sixty-two 
year lease; any such evidence would just have been expert 
speculation.3 Our point was and is that when the landowners 
2(...continued) 
landowners1 interests are determined to be liable for the lien, 
then Allen Steel would be the prevailing party to be awarded 
attorney's fees against the landowners, rather than the reverse. 
See Brief of Respondent (Cross-Appellant) at 34. The purpose of 
the cross-appeal was to reverse the award of attorney's fees to 
the landowners and so the contrary sentence should be stricken 
from the opinion. 
3
 This is not to diminish that the landowners bargained for 
and received the right to, at least, the potential benefit of the 
improvements at the end of the lease term. Particularly where 
the Crossroads Mall and Tower replaced "a very sad state of 
condition, old buildings, broken down buildings, abandoned 
buildings . . . pretty much like a deserted city," R 2493, the 
value to the lessor of such significant improvements worth in 
excess of $40 million, see, e.g., R 2508 & R 3340, is presumed 
even in the case of a long lease. See Mid-West Engineering & 
Construction Co. v. Campagna, 397 S.W.2d 616, 628 (Mo. 1965) (99-
year ground lease requiring only "a commercial building or 
buildings costing not less than One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000) . . . paid and discharged by Lessee," id. at 619). 
(continued...) 
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required in the leases that the mall and office building be 
constructed, they did so in order to receive benefits. Those 
benefits were, not merely those they anticipated after the lease 
terminated, but were those they bargained to receive during the 
leasehold period,4 including the benefit of percentage rents from 
operations in the improvements they required the lessee to 
construct.5 By contracting to receive those benefits, they made 
Crossroads their "agent, contractor, or otherwise," within the 
meaning of the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3, to accomplish 
the construction. 
That is the point that we ask the Court to rule on, but 
it is not addressed in the opinion. In no other state is 
residual value at the end of the lease the only way that the 
3(...continued) 
What technological changes will make the mall and office building 
obsolete? If not presumed from the enormous cost of the 
improvements, the value of improvements in the middle of the 21st 
Century is inherently speculative and impossible to show in any 
meaningful way. 
4
 Benefits, in addition to value at the end of the stated 
lease term, include: (1) value of improvements as security for 
rent and other lessee obligations; (2) value of improvements in 
the event of early termination of lease; and (3) value of 
percentage rentals and development of property. A landlord may 
have other benefits in mind in requiring the improvements. In a 
long term lease, value at the end of the stated lease term is 
probably the least significant factor of value to the freehold 
interest because after discounting for present value it is worth 
a tiny fraction of the future amount today. 
5
 Liens against the lessor's interest are proper in light of 
percentage rentals. Los Banos Gravel Company v. Freeman, 58 Cal. 
App. 3d 785, 130 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1976); Media Five Limited v. 
Yakimetz. 631 P.2d 1211 (Hawaii App. 1981). 
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landowner may be held liable. Such a rule is too easily drafted 
around by lease language requiring expensive improvements that 
are surrendered to the lessor, but expressly not requiring (only 
permitting) that they have projected residual value. Making 
residual value an absolute requirement is not required by the 
language of the mechanic's lien statute and is not good policy. 
What if the construction is not finished? This Court has already 
determined that actual construction of improvements is not 
necessary for the lien to attach to the interest of a long-term 
lessor. Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 
397, 464 P.2d 387, 388 (1970). The broad view of benefit to the 
landowner in Zions First National, notwithstanding an 85-vear 
lease, was evidenced by the Court's observation: "The sixteen-
page lease agreement . . . contains numerous provisions which, if 
any structure or improvement be erected, grant substantial 
benefits which will inure to the lessor's reversionary interest." 
Id. at 399, 464 P.2d at 389 (emphasis added). Other states also 
follow the rule that if the owner requires the lessee to do the 
construction, he thereby makes the lessee his "statutory agent" 
for purposes of mechanic's liens. The Court's holding, as 
written, makes Utah a minority of one. 
One problem with a rule that focuses on economic value 
at the end of the stated lease term is highlighted by the long 
established rule regarding a vendor's interest. Thus "[w]here 
the contract between the vendor and vendee requires the latter to 
build, it constitutes him the agent of the vendor for the purpose 
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of subjecting the whole title to the liens . . . ," 58 A.L.R. 
911, 943 (1929); see, e.g., Idaho Lumber v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 
710 P.2d 647, 651-52 (App. 1985) ("the lessee (or vendee) is said 
to become the agent of the owner, and in those cases the interest 
of the owner . . . will become subject to the lien.") Utah law 
similarly has noted the lack of any such contract requirement for 
improvements in both cases involving a vendorfs interest and in 
no way held that vendors requiring improvements were immune from 
liens. See Burton Lumber Co. v. Howard, 92 Utah 92, 98, 66 P.2d 
134, 136 (1937); Belnap v. Condon, 34 Utah 213, 218-22, 97 P. 
Ill, 113-114 (1908). Now, however, this generally accepted 
principle that a vendee may be a statutory agent of the vendor 
collides with the opinion in this case, which overlooks all 
benefits to the freehold during the lease term and insists that 
there be economic benefit proven beyond the stated term of the 
lease. When vendees and lessees required to make improvements 
are treated in other jurisdictions as such statutory agents, 
proper construction of the Utah statute should provide lien 
claimants with at least that level of protection commonly enjoyed 
by lien claimants in other states. 
Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 
(Utah 1982), as the opinion observes, stated "'a lessor is 
subject to a lien for improvements by a tenant if the lease 
"requires or obligates the tenant to construct improvements which 
101789.mbJxdp.perd%ear.aac 5 
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substantially enhance the value of the freehold . . . ."' 
Interiors Contracting. 648 P.2d at 1387 fUtlev v. Wear, 333 
S.W.2d 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (emphasis in original)." Opinion 
at 22 (footnote added). Utley primarily involved the issue of 
whether, absent an express requirement so to do, an implied 
requirement to make the improvements existed under the 
circumstances. In such a case, the projected value of the 
improvements at the end of the lease may be an important factor 
depending on the circumstances. However, Utley also stated, as 
quoted in Interiors Contracting, 648 P.2d at 1387, and Zions 
First National, 23 Utah 2d at 400, 464 P.2d at 390, that when the 
tenant is required to make the improvements, "[h]e has no other 
option, and hence he is the landlord's (implied) agent to the 
extent of subjecting the property to a lien . . . ." 333 S.W.2d 
at 793. See also, Mid-West Engineering & Construction Co. v. 
Campagna, 397 S.W.2d 616, 625 (Mo. 1965)(lessee agent as a matter 
of law). 
The statute provides that a lien arises with respect to 
labor or materials furnished "whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, 
contractor, or otherwise." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (emphasis 
added). Thus, when the owner enters into a contract under which 
"Freehold" is simply a synonym for the landowner's 
interest. See, e.g., Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 
267, 272 (Utah 1982); Black's Law Dictionary 793 (rev. 4th ed. 
1968). 
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"any other person" is required to build specific improvements 
from which the landowner might receive income, the determination 
of whether a lien arises should not be so random as to hinge on 
whether the "other person" is "a contractor," in which case 
indisputably a lien arises, or "a lessee," in which case, 
according to the opinion, a lien may fail. There is no 
difference in the situations where the landowner requires a 
contractor to build an unprofitable store and where he requires a 
tenant to build a store and pay percentage rents. Whatever the 
label, the owner caused the improvements to be erected and is 
fairly responsible for them to the extent of his interest in the 
property. 
Why should the unpaid subcontractor have to prove that 
the owner made a good long term deal? That he made the deal 
should be enough to require him to pay for it. "That his 
judgment was bad, or that he was disappointed by later events, is 
of no moment." Utley v. Wear, 333 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Mo. App. 
1960). The landowners' argument "after the fact, disclaiming any 
benefit from the improvements is not timely and is self-serving." 
Markely v. General Fine Equipment Co., 17 Wash. App. 480, 563 
P.2d 1316, 1319 (1977). 
The opinion's conclusion that Crossroads was not the 
landowners' agent for purposes of the mechanic's lien statute is 
inconsistent with the stipulated fact that the landowners 
required Crossroads to construct the project improvements. 
Agency for purposes of a mechanic's lien is a broader principle 
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than ordinary agency for contract purposes. Thus, other 
jurisdictions apply one simple, consistent rule. It is that the 
lessor's interest is subject to a lien when the lessee is 
required to make the improvements because the lessee then is, as 
a matter of law for purposes of the mechanic's lien statute, the 
lessor's agent. See, e.g., Bobo v. John W. Lattimore, 
Contractor, 12 Ariz. App. 137, 468 P.2d 404 (1970); Robert L. 
Weed, Architect v. Horning, 33 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1947); Robb v. 
Lott Paving Co., 289 So. 2d 776 (Fla. App. 1974); Media Five 
Limited v. Yakimetz, 2 Hawaii App. 339, 631 P.2d 1211 (1981); 
Christianson v. Idaho Land Developers, Inc., 104 Idaho 458, 660 
P.2d 70 (App. 1983); Stroh Corp. v. K&S Development Corp., 247 
An "agent, at least to some extent, within the 
contemplation of the mechanics' lien statute," Interiors 
Contracting, 648 P.2d at 1387, may create a lien on the 
landowner's interest without having the power to impose "personal 
liability" for the debt on the landowner. The difference between 
situations of ordinary agency, in which the principal is 
generally the only party personally liable on the contract, and 
of statutory agency for purposes of a mechanic's lien, in which 
the only party personally liable is likely to be the "agent" is 
well-recognized. See, e.g., Interiors Contracting, 648 P.2d at 
1386-87 (lease provisions making lessee responsible "cannot 
override the effect of the mechanic's lien law" as to 
nonparties); Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-16; Opinion at 23-24 (Part 
VIII). See also Daniel v. M.J. Development, Inc., 603 P.2d 947, 
950 (Colo. App. 1979) (even in case of lien against lessor's 
interest, no personal judgment against lessors); Keefer v. 
Lavender, 74 Ariz. 24, 243 P.2d 457, 459 (1952) (general 
contractor is "statutory agent of the property owner for the sole 
purpose of securing the lien rights of the workmen, etc. The 
agency does not extend further."); see generally, 53 Am. Jur. 2d 
Mechanics' Liens § 122 ("In regard to the creation of mechanics' 
liens, regard must be had not only for common-law agents, but 
also for statutory agents."); § 127 (vendee as statutory agent of 
vendor); § 132 (lessee as statutory agent of lessor); and § 151 
(contractor as statutory agent of owner). 
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N.W.2d 750 (Iowa 1976); Mid-West Engineering & Construction Co. 
v. Campagna, 397 S.W.2d 616 (Mo. 1965); Markley v. General Fire 
Equipment. 17 Wash. App. 480, 563 P.2d 1316 (1977); Dunlap v. 
Hinkle, 317 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1984).8 This Court should rehear 
this issue in order to determine whether the rule stated in the 
opinion properly applies the concept of "statutory agency" to 
give mechanic's lien claimants the protection they are due under 
an appropriately broad and liberal construction of the mechanic's 
lien statute. 
DATED: October 26 , 1989. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
By /s/ H. Dennis Piercey 
Joseph J. Palmer 
H. Dennis Piercey 
Attorneys for Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant Allen Steel 
Co. 
° Morrow v. Merritt. 16 Utah 412, 52 P. 667 (1898), read as 
requiring the improvements, arguably is contrary, but then it 
would also be contrary to the opinion in this case as Morrow did 
not look at all to the value conferred by the improvements at any 
time. The statement of the law and the holding in Morrow shows 
that the court there treated the case not as one involving a 
lessor's requirement of the improvement, but only as one 
involving "permission of the lessor," id. at 417, 52 P. at 668, 
"his consent," id., 52 P. at 669, or "knowledge," id., 52 P. at 
668. It is undisputed that knowledge or consent alone is not 
enough. Interiors Contracting. 648 P.2d at 1386; Zions First 
National, 464 P.2d at 390. Morrow should be read no more broadly 
than that. Gorman v. Birrell, 41 Utah 274, 125 P. 685 (1912), 
although cited at page 22 in the opinion here as a "requirement" 
case, merely involved circumstances in which the owner "permitted 
the alterations to be made and was present and about the 
apartments and saw them being made." Id. at 279, 125 P. at 687. 
Gorman contains no statement to the effect that the lessee was 
obligated to the lessor to make the alterations. 
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